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Murray v. United States:
The Court Takes Another Swipe
At The Warrant Requirement
By Professor Steven Grossman

The protection afforded by the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment and
the use of the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for unlawful searches and seizures
have been significantly reduced by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Murray
v. United States. I Although somewhat
overlooked because of a flurry of decisions
during the final weeks of its term involving other important issues such as the constitutionality of the independent counsel, 2
the ability of states to execute minors,3 and
the right to confront victims in child sexabuse cases,4 the Court's opinion in Mur·
ray is a most significant one.
Stated most succinctly, Murray holds
that when the police acting with probable
cause but in violation of the warrant
requirement discover evidence of a crime,
that evidence will be admissible if the
police later obtain a search warrant
without using the information gained during the unlawful search. Essentially, the
Court's approach is to treat the first
unlawful entry and search as if it never
happened, so that the police are placed in
a position "no worse off"5 than if that
search had not been conducted. The purpose of this article is to show how this
approach strikes directly at the purpose
behind the warrant requirement and runs
precisely counter to the avowed goal of the
exclusionary rule, which is the deterrence
of illegal police activity.
The facts of Murray are largely undisputed. Federal agents observed two vehicles, operated by the defendant and his
co-conspirator,' drive into a warehouse in
South Boston. Twenty minutes later the
same two vehicles, driven by the same
individuals, emerged from the warehouse.

Shortly thereafter these two vehicles were
stopped and pursuant to a lawful search
found to contain marijuana. The agents
then forcibly entered the warehouse and
observed large burlap-wrapped bales
which were later found to contain marijuana. The bales were left undisturbed, and
the agents secured the warehouse until a
warrant was obtained. This warrant,
signed eight hours after the unlawful
entry, was apparently obtained without
the use of information gained through that
entry. During the search conducted after
the warrant was issued, the police seized
270 bales of marijuana and other incriminating evidence. Some of this evidence had
been discovered during the previous
unlawful entry and some was seen for the
first time during the warrant-based search. 6
F our years earlier in the case of Segura v.
United States/ the Court had decided in a
factual situation similar to Murray that evidence uncovered for the first time during
the post-warrant search was admissible,
because the discovery of that evidence had
a source independent of the original
unlawful search (the independent source
rule). The Court in Segura, however, specifically left undecided the question of the
admissibility of the evidence discovered by
the unlawful pre-warrant search and, in
fact, suggested different treatment for such
evidence. 8 In Murray, however, the Court
rejected the need to treat the evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful entry any different than the evidence discovered after
the warrant is obtained.
In treating the evidence discovered
before the warrant is obtained the same as
that obtained after the warrant is issued,
the Court held that the independent

source exception to the exclusionary rule
applies to both types of evidence. In so
doing the Court negated the significance of
the fact that the bales of marijuana had
already been discovered and seized9 prior
to their seizure by independent lawful
means. Contrary to the Court's holding,
the seizure of tangible evidence in violation of the warrant requirement, as
occurred in Murray, should preclude the
use of the independent source rule and lead
instead to consideration of the doctrine of
inevitable discovery.
The Murray Court correctly observed
that the independent source rule has been
applied to "evidence acquired by an
untainted search which is identical to the
evidence unlawfully acquired." 10 In support
of this position, the Court cites Justice
Holmes' well known opinion for the
Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States. 11 Comparing the facts of
Silverthorne and the language quoted by
the Murray Court from Holmes' opinion
reveals a crucial distinction from the Mur·
ray case.
In Silverthorne, government agents, after
arresting the defendant, seized documents
from his office in violation of the warrant
requirement. Even though the documents
were later returned to the defendant, the
government sought to use information
acquired from the documents in its prosecution. 12 In its decision, the Court established the derivative evidence rule
declaring that not only the illegally seized
evidence but any information derived
from it cannot be used by the prosecution.
As noted in Murray, however, the Court in
Silverthorne went on to say:
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"Of course this does not mean that the

facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained
from an independent source they may be
proved like any others (emphasis added)."IJ Justice Holmes referred to "knowledge" or "facts" as the kind of evidence
which although discovered illegally can be
admissible if later learned through independent lawful means.
Limiting the application of the independent source rule to intangible evidence
when the government seeks to apply it to
the same evidence seized first unlawfully
and later legally is sensible for several
reasons. First, as the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit observed in
United States v. Silvestri, 14 intangible evidence, such as information, cannot be seized in the manner in which tangible
evidence is seized. 15 Facts cannot be
possessed or controlled in the same way as
a tangible item, and these facts can be
learned or "seized" an infinite number of
new ways. A tangible item can be seized at
one moment only (unless of course control
of the item is surrendered and later
reasserted, which did not occur in Murray).
Therefore, tanjcible evidence cannot be
"reseized" without, in effect, pretending
the original seizure did not occur.
Although the Court dismisses this
approach as "metaphysical,"16 it surely is
preferable to one based on the illogical
notion of reseizure of an object, the control of which was never surrendered.
The consequence of the Murray Court's
approach to reseizure of tangible items is
the likelihood of even more undesirable
and absurd results. What, for example,
should occur if prior to the issuance of a
search warrant, the police remove the
evidence discovered during an unlawful
search? Can this evidence later be "reseized" in the inventory room at the police
station? If, as the Court maintains, tangible
evidence is treated the same as intangible
for purposes of the independent source
rule, then, since the location of the discovery of intangible information is no bar to
its admissibility, it should not be so for
tangible evidence either .. Further, if the
sole criterion for admitting the evidence is
that its lawful discovery was genuinely
independent of the prior illegal discovery,
such could still be the case even where the
evidence is moved. 17 If evidence seized and
removed to the police station after an illegal search is saved by the independent
source rule, the policy of "search and seize
first and obtain a warrant later" will be
legitimated.
The Court should have rejected the concept of reseizure of tangible evidence necessary for application of the independent

source rule in Murray and considered
instead whether the doctrine of inevitable
discovery should be applied. The doctrine
of inevitable discovery or hypothetical
independent source rule allows for the
admissibility of evidence seized unlawfully
when the government can show the likelihood that it would ultimately have
acquired the evidence by lawful means. 18
Such was the case in Nix v. Williams l9

"Facts cannot be
possessed. .. in the
same way as a
tangible item . .. "
where the defendant was induced, in violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel, into divulging where he had left the
body of his murder victim.20 The Court in
Williams ultimately allowed evidence
from the body at trial because it concluded
that a large scale search for the victim
would have uncovered the body eventually.21 In Murray, the Court could have said
that, given the existence of probable cause
and the pre-entry inclination of the police
to seek a warrant, the evidence would have
been discovered eventually through lawful
means. 22 While such an application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine would be
premised on a more sensible and honest
approach to the exclusionary rule
(although just as damaging to the purposes
of both the exclusionary rule and the warrant requirement), the Court may have
chosen to use the independent source rule
for reasons related to differences in the
application and the nature of the two doctrines.
Had the Court applied the doctrine of
inevitable discovery to the facts of Murray,
it would have raised even greater questions
concerning the breadth of its holding. For
example, if the police illegally enter a
dwelling and seize evidence but never
obtain a warrant, will the evidence be
admitted if it can be shown that the police
ultimately intended to get a warrant and
that in fact such a warrant would have
been issued? The doctrine of inevitable discovery arguably should be applied to such
a situation especially since failure to do so
would place the police in a "worse position" than if the illegal search had not
occurredP Such a holding, however,
would likely reduce the number of times
the police seek a warrant.24

Perhaps an important difference
between the nature of the independent
source and inevitable discovery doctrines
contributed to the Court's opting for the
former in Murray. When the independent
source rule is applied, the evidence has in
fact been discovered through lawful means
independent of the previous illegality. As
the causal link between the illegal act and
the discovery of the evidence has largely
been severed, it is reasonable to look at the
exclusionary rule as being inapplicable. 25
When the inevitable discovery doctrine is
applied, however, the seizure of the evidence is through unlawful means alone
and the exclusionary rule is clearly
applicable. Admission of the evidence
would then require overcoming or satisfying the exclusionary rule by examining the
costs and benefits of exclusion in a specific
situation.26 Primarily, the difference
between the two doctrines reflects the distinction between defining the limits of the
exclusionary rule on one hand and describing its values on anotherF While consideration of the limits of the exclusionary rule
when applying the independent source
rule to warrant avoidance situations calls
for an examination of the purposes of the
exclusionary rule and warrant requirements, application of the inevitable discovery doctrine makes the need for such an
examination of values even more acute.
With the above in mind, it becomes
important to examine the values at stake in
the Court's decision to admit evidence
seized initially during a search conducted
in violation of the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment.
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
activity.28 The defendant in the Murray
case argued that admitting the evidence
seized during the unlawful entry of the
warehouse would remove this deterrent
impact upon the police and in fact would
give the police an incentive to violate the
warrant requirement. The defendant
claimed that police possessing probable
cause would routinely enter dwellings
without search warrants, secure in the
knowledge that if evidence of a crime was
found, a warrant could safely be obtained
later. If no evidence was found, the time
and effort needed to obtain a warrant
would be saved. 29 The Court's response to
this argument was to note the unlikelihood that a police officer would risk evidentiary suppression by entering illegally,
"since his action would add to the normal
burden of convincing a magistrate that
there is probable cause the much more
onerous burden of convincing a trial court
that no information gained from the illegal
entry affected either the law enforcement
officer's decision to seek a warrant or the
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magistrate's decision to grant it."JO The
Court's response is disturbing for two
reasons: first, because its overestimation of
the burden placed on the officer who acts
without a warrant skews its assessment of
police incentives and deterrence; and
second, because the result of its response is
essentially a merger of the probable cause
and warrant requirements of the fourth
amendment, effectively eviscerating the
latter.
These consequences can most easily be
seen by looking at what undoubtedly will
be a not uncommon situation in the postMurray criminal law. A police officer, arm·
ed with information from two reliable
informants, decides to enter a suspect's
house without a warrant. He tells his sergeant of his plan and his intention to
obtain a warrant after the search is complete. The officer finds drugs, then obtains
a search warrant from a magistrate and
reseizes the evidence. Clearly this evidence
should be admissible under Murray as the
officer ultimately seized the evidence
under a warrant obtained without any
information gained from the unlawful
entry and which he always intended to
seek. Let us now weigh the deterrent
impact on this officer regarding his
decision to enter and search before seeking
a warrant.
Not presenting the probable cause to a
magistrate before the search was not much
of a risk for the officer since his conclusion
that he had probable cause is likely to be
a correct one, especially after Illinois v.
Gates. J1 If his assessment of probable cause
is incorrect, he has lost nothing since he
would have been unsuccessful in obtaining
a warrant, and at least he has removed
some drugs from the community. The
"more onerous burden" alluded to by the
Court was satisfied by demonstrating that
the reliable informants communicated to
the officer before the entry and by the offi·
cer's stated intention to seek a warrant.
The Court made it particularly easy to
prove the officer's inclination to obtain a
warrant by rejecting Justice Marshall's
proposed requirement that at least the offi·
cer should have to point to some histori·
cally verifiable fact, e.g., that the warrant
process had already been initiated in some
form prior to the unlawful entry. JZ This
officer, therefore, could have overcome
this burden merely by expressing for the
first time at a suppression hearing his presearch intention to seek a warrant, and
such would have been sufficient to meet
the officer's burden unless the "facts
render those assurances implausible."
Contrary to the Court's assertion, there is
little to deter the officer from searching
first and obtaining a warrant later. There-

fore a deliberate, unreasonable decision to
avoid the warrant requirement, arguably
the kind of police action requiring the
highest level of deterrence,)) has been
legitimated.
The second result of the Court's
approach lies in the direct attack of this
decision on the purpose behind the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. The
warrant clause is designed to insure that
magistrates will be interposed between the
forces of government and the individual
suspect.)~ These magistrates are charged
with the responsibility of forming their
own opinions as to whether probable
cause exists prior to the time that the
government is permitted to intrude into
those areas protected by the fourth amendment. Post hoc judicial determinations of

"Murray ... will
reduce the value of
the exclusionary
ru l e . .. "

efit either directly or indirectly from their
wrongdoing, neither should they be placed
in a position worse than if the illegality
had not occurred. 467 U.s. 431, 443 (1984).
The grafting of the "no worse off" principle onto the derivative evidence rule in
Williams has been criticized as being the
result of the Court's misreading of prior
cases. Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclu·

sionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a
Fair Trial, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 15866 (1984).
6 _ _ U.S. at _._, 108 S. Ct. at 2532
( 1988).
7 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
8 In responding to the assertion that the
ruling in Segura would reduce the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule, Chief
Justice Burger wrote, "officers who enter
illegally will recognize that whatever evi·
dence they discover as a direct result of the
entry may be suppressed, as it was by the
Court of Appeals in this case." Id. at 812
(opinion joined by O'Connor, J.) cited in
Murray, __ U.S. at __, 108 S. Ct. at
2540 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9 The Court makes no claim that the bales
discovered during the unlawful entry were
not seized, and in fact implicitly concedes
seizure by referring to the post-warrant
activity as "reseizure." __ U.S. at __ ,
108 S. Ct. at 2535.
10

probable cause in situations where warrants are clearly required result in an abandonment of the magistrate's role as a buffer between the state and its citizens.35 No
amount of probable cause can by itself satisfy these concerns addressed by the warrant clause. By removing the magistrate as
a buffer, the Court has effectively merged
the warrant clause and the probable cause
requirements resulting in the inevitable
diminution of the warrant clause.
The decision of the Supreme Court in
Murray v. United States is an unfortunate
one in its misapplication of the independent source rule. This decision will
weaken the protection afforded by the
warrant requirement and will reduce the
value of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to unlawful searches and seizures.
Footnotes
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